Archive for the ‘Meta-ethics’ Category

Moral Nihilism


If we take moral scepticism seriously and find that we cannot find a satisfactory answer to the sceptic, we seem to be faced with the prospect that we cannot really justify morality.    This is the view that there are no such things as right and wrong, and no such thing as morality in general (or […]

• Kant’s is a deontological and absolutist moral theory. • ‘Deon’ is the ancient Greek word for duty. (‘Dei’ = one must.) Deontological moral theories permit or forbid different actions by arguing that each of them is right or wrong with respect to moral duties. Deontological theories state that actions are right or wrong in […]



If normative ethics provides us with a (rationally defensible) theory of right and wrong action, we still need a theory that can tell us something about ‘rightness’ and ‘wrongness’ and what is involved in using these terms. There are many different types of meta-ethical theories. It is worth familiarising yourself with some of the more […]