Archive for the ‘Minds’ Category

As mentioned in a previous lesson, Wittgenstein is noted for having developed two distinct philosophies. In the early work (like the Tractatus) Wittgenstein tried to spell out precisely what a logically constructed language can (and cannot) be used to say. Its seven basic propositions simply state that language, thought, and reality share a common structure, […]



We normally think of zombies as flesh-eating soulless automations animated by evil forces or radioactive waste. In philosophy of mind, ‘zombies’ are hypothetical creatures that share all the physical characteristics of human beings – including behaviour – but are entirely devoid of consciousness. This can even extend to sharing neurological and biochemical structures. Zombies are […]



Another direct response to this form of skepticism is behaviourism, which in philosophy is associated with Skinner, Carnap and Ryle. In psychology, behaviourism is the view that all human activities (including inner mental life) are exhaustively described by accounts of behaviour. In philosophy of mind behaviourism is the thesis that when we refer to psychological […]

This argument against skepticism about other minds is often credited to Mill. ‘I conclude that other human beings have feelings like me because, first, they have bodies like me, which I know in my own case, to be the antecedent condition of feelings; and because secondly, they exhibit the acts, and other outward signs, which […]

The ‘Problem of Other Minds’ is an epistemological problem. It is based on the difference between the way we experience our own selves and the way we experience the selves of others. Consider the kinds of mental states that we have ourselves such as beliefs, desires, emotions and feelings.We have direct access to these for […]